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Abstract: Thick concepts, namely those concepts that describe and evaluate simultaneously, 
present a challenge to science. Since science does not have a monopoly on value judgments, 
what is responsible research involving such concepts? Using measurement of wellbeing as 
an example, we first present the options open to researchers wishing to study phenomena 
denoted by such concepts. We argue that while it is possible to treat these concepts as 
technical terms, or to make the relevant value judgment in-house, the responsible thing to 
do, especially in the context of public policy, is to make this value judgment through a 
legitimate political process that includes all the stakeholders of this research. We then 
develop a participatory model of measurement based on the ideal of co-production. To 
show that this model is feasible and realistic, we illustrate it with a case study of co-
production of a concept of thriving conducted by the authors in collaboration with a UK 
anti-poverty charity Turn2us. 
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Value-laden phenomena – wellbeing, resilience, biodiversity, sustainability, vulnerability, 
quality of care, and so on – are ubiquitous in contemporary social and life sciences. In these 
cases, the very definition of a scientific term requires an evaluative standard, often a 
controversial one. Judgments about moral, political or aesthetic value thus enter into the 
most technical aspects of research, namely measurement. The ongoing efforts to develop 
an evidence base around, for instance, well-being, requires defining it as either a subjective 
judgment measured by self-reports, or an objective state measured by behavioural or social 
indicators, or some combination of the two. Which self-reports and which indicators to 
select is a matter of controversy, often pitting against each other competing visions of the 
good life.  
 
Philosophers engage with these issues through the notion of ‘thick concepts’, those that 
describe and evaluate simultaneously. Their presence in science is widely recognised and 
well documented.1 Commentators typically use thick concepts to challenge certain 
traditional views of the objectivity and value-freedom of science. But beyond this it is less 
clear what practical recommendations to follow in the presence of thick concepts. What is 
responsible practice when it comes to the measurement of phenomena they pick out? 
Should these concepts be eliminated, subjected to special methods, celebrated and 
multiplied? In this paper we lay out the options and make concrete the idea that 
measurement of thick concepts should be democratised. 
 
In Part I we articulate three strategies open to researchers working with thick concepts. 
They are to redefine thick concepts as technical terms that lose their evaluative content, to 
assume full responsibility for making the relevant value judgment, and finally to make the 
value judgment through a legitimate political process. We submit that these options, once 
articulated with care, are likely exhaustive, with all viable approaches falling in one or the 
other of the three. They also helpfully systematise various proposals other commentators 
articulated less explicitly.  
 
In Part II we argue that the third strategy is the responsible choice, other things being equal. 
Our proposal takes its cue from the growing theory and practice of participatory science, 
but focuses specifically on measurement. Our core claim is that measures of variables 
picked out by thick concepts can and should be co-produced in collaboration with 
stakeholders who bring distinctive types of expertise, each relevant to measurement. The 
resulting instruments should blend values of all stakeholders with technical and practical 
constraints on the instruments themselves.  
 
 
1 See Kirchin 2013 on thick concept in ethics; Reiss 2010, Root 2007, Abend 2019, Djordjevic and Herfeld 2021 
on social sciences; Dupre 2007, Hawthorne 2013, Kingma 2014, Stegenga 2015a on life and medical sciences. 





By way of a proof of concept we end with a case study. We report on a process of co-
producing a conception of 'thriving' that the authors implemented with Turn2us, a national 
anti-poverty charity in the UK. While the theoretical argument in Parts I and II shows that 
the co-production of measurement scales is desirable, the case study shows that there is 
nothing inherently impossible in our proposal to democratise measurement.  
 
 
Part I: Three available strategies 
 
Consider the definition of thick concepts given by Elizabeth Anderson:  
 
A concept is thickly evaluative if (a) its application is guided by empirical facts; (b) it 
licenses normative inferences; and (c) interests and values guide the extension of the 
concept (that is, what unifies items falling under the concept is the relation they 
bear to some common or analogous interests or values)(2002, 504-505). 
 
This is a general definition which Anderson goes on to apply to the concept of 'intelligence', 
but it fits 'well-being', our example throughout this paper. Users of this concept certainly 
aim to ascribe it on empirical grounds, as Anderson requires in condition (a). Informally, 
parents eyeball their child’s behaviour to check if they are well, whereas more formal 
indices that have proliferated in the recent decades guide the application of this concept in 
contexts of development, healthcare, management, and policy making. Once these 
assessments are made, they certainly feed into practical decisions about what needs to be 
done to improve wellbeing. That is condition (b) and the point behind any evidence-based 
endeavour whether in parenting, self-help, or wellbeing public policy.2 Finally, as condition 
(c) stipulates, definitions of wellbeing require judgments about what is good for the people 
whose wellbeing is in question. This is why there are deep and longstanding disagreements 
among researchers of wellbeing about, among other issues, whether wellbeing is a mental 
state and if so which one. Value commitments such as hedonism, utilitarianism, liberalism, 
and eudaimonism are regularly invoked as inspirations for adopting one or another 
approach to wellbeing.3 So wellbeing is certainly a thick concept in Anderson’s sense. 
 
Much of the discussion of thick concepts in philosophy of science, including Anderson’s own 
writings, has been dedicated either to showing their presence or to arguing for their 
ineliminability and legitimacy in the face of traditional demands on science.4 We find it 
helpful to systematise these discussions into three strategies.  
 
 
I.1 Strategy One: Turn thick concepts into technical terms. 
 
Often the most natural way for scientists to proceed is to get rid of the evaluative element 
of thick concepts, thereby turning them into technical terms. Examples from economics 
include the “discount rate” and “cost of living” (Stapleford 2009, Deringer 2018). Essentially 
 
2 See Dolan and Peasegood 2008, Dolan and White 2007, Clarke et al 2018, Frijters et al 2020 among many 
calls for evidence-based wellbeing public policy. 
3  See Haybron and Tiberius 2015, Fleurbaey and Adler 2016 on the political theory behind wellbeing policy. 




this amounts to denying that thick concepts exist as such, since if they do such a separation 
is not supposed to be possible (Putnam 2004). This approach comes naturally because high 
profile success of scientific theories often consists in postulating new concepts and showing 
their fruitfulness through application.5 If so, it makes no sense to demand that a concept 
properly captures some pre-theoretical notion because conceptual change is the whole 
point. Is Newtonian mass really what people mean by ‘mass’? Maybe not, but that does not 
matter if Newtonian mass enables as many epistemic achievements as it does.  
 
In the sciences with thick evaluative terms, we rarely see such reasoning explicitly. No 
wellbeing researcher literally says: "It does not matter if life satisfaction is really wellbeing. 
We use ‘wellbeing’ to mean ‘life satisfaction' because life satisfaction is a more fruitful 
concept". Nevertheless it is possible to pick up traces of such reasoning in the way that 
scientists justify their operationalisations in the methodology sections of research articles 
(Cohen Kaminitz 2018). It is common to encounter researchers adopting a particular 
definition of wellbeing and justifying it because it fits best their measurement tools, or 
enables the use of new dataset, or because it is theoretically interesting, or because it fits 
previous definitions, or models.6 Absent in such reasoning is any explicit recognition of the 
evaluative element in the meaning of the concept and absent is an attempt to supply an 
argument that justifies this element in a way that evaluative concepts should be justified.  
 
While it is rare to encounter this strategy in its pure form in published wellbeing research, 
there exists an attempt to defend such a stance explicitly. Ernst Nagel did so with his 
distinction between appraising and characterising value judgments (Nagel 1961). Scientists 
appraise when they approve or disapprove of something on the basis of a commitment to 
an ideal – for example, when they use the thick term ‘anemic’ to highlight how poorly an 
organism is faring. In contrast, scientists characterise when, to use Nagel’s own words, their 
“value judgement expresses an estimate of the degree to which some commonly recognised 
… type of action object or institution is embodied in a given instance”(Nagel 1961, 492). In 
the first case the scientist endorses the value, while in the second they merely report that 
an animal is anemic according to an agreed definition. Nagel puts forward this distinction to 
vindicate the possibility of value-freedom of science even when its central concepts are 
thick. He says that even if the two kinds of value judgments will in practice bleed into each 
other, it is still logically possible to stick to characterising rather than appraising. Nagel also 
thinks this is desirable because scientific knowledge should be objective in the sense of 
being "value-free and unbiased" (ibid, 502). 
 
Although he does not use our language, Nagel’s proposal is effectively to place appraising 
value judgments outside science and treat all thick terms in a manner that is agnostic about 
their evaluative element. These terms thus become technical in the sense that their 
everyday evaluative connotation is erased and they are judged only by the more familiar 
 
5 The idea that the main scientific achievement is in conceptualising nature in fruitful new ways is a staple in 
history and philosophy of science, especially the Kantian strands. It is central to Carnap 1950, a more recent 
restatement is Friedman 2001. 
6 Arguably Daniel Kahneman’s 1999 defence of the concept of ‘objective happiness’ followed this strategy. 
Instead of making an ethical case that wellbeing is happiness, he positioned it as an interesting measurable 




epistemic virtues of scope, simplicity, empirical adequacy, etc. They become scientific terms 
first and foremost. 
 
 
I.2 Strategy Two: Keep the value judgment in-house 
 
We said that the first strategy comes naturally to scientists with traditional views of science, 
but it is also common to encounter the second strategy. This is when researchers mount, 
first, an explicitly normative argument in favour of adopting one or another 
operationalisation of a thick concept and, secondly, do so by appeal to their own personal 
normative intuitions or the consensus of their discipline. Both parts are important because, 
as we shall see shortly, it is possible to have the first without the second. As an example of 
this strategy, consider the following from Oishi et al. (2018, p. 164-165): 
 
What is a good society? From the perspective of the science of happiness, a 
good society is a society that makes its citizens happy. Various policy ideas can 
be evaluated in terms of happiness.  
 
In the well-being space, Strategy Two leads traditional economists to intentionally adopt a 
preference-satisfaction account of welfare, psychologists to adopt mental-state accounts, 
and so on. Crucially, this adoption is not agnostic, as in the first strategy, but rather it is 
mindful and deliberate. It comes with an attempt to defend a given operationalisation by 
marshalling arguments about its ethical appropriateness. In the wellbeing sciences the 
second strategy has been prominent ever since the field matured in the 1990s. The 
proponents of life satisfaction often justify it by saying that it empowers respondents to 
decide what matters. For example, Clark et al. (2018, p. 4) give following three reasons for 
using life satisfaction metrics over measures of affect or meaning in life: 
 
First, it is comprehensive—it refers to the whole of a person’s life these days. 
Second, it is clear to the reader—it involves no process of aggregation by 
researchers. Third, and most important, it is democratic—it allows individuals to 
assess their lives on the basis of whatever they consider important to 
themselves.  
 
Finally there are also famous deployments of Aristotelian considerations when defending 
accounts of wellbeing in terms of character and virtues (Seligman 2012) or in terms of 
capabilities (Alkire et al 2015). 
 
These attempts by social scientists to build a normative case for thick concepts do not 
always satisfy professional ethicists and there is thus a whole literature of philosophers 
challenging the justifications of measures of wellbeing given by scientists.7 More recently, 
there have been calls for philosophers and psychologists to collaborate more closely in a 
process of conceptual engineering to develop an account of wellbeing that is descriptively, 
empirically, and normatively adequate for psychological science.8 Our point is only to note 
that sometimes scientists do take it upon themselves to mount normative arguments based 
 
7 Haybron 2008, Feldman 2010, Nussbaum 2000 among many others. 




on their own visions of the good life and to the extent that they do, they see this strategy as 
open to them qua scientists. 
 
 
I.3 Strategy Three: Seek political legitimacy 
 
Suppose you refuse to turn a thick term into a technical term, and you lack the assurance to 
make the value judgment yourself. What more can you do? The third strategy, as we see it, 
is to fill out the thick content by a legitimate political process. The motivation behind this 
option is simple: if the practice of science requires making value judgments about essential 
aspects of life such as wellbeing, and if this knowledge is sometimes close to power and 
therefore potentially coercion, then these judgments should be subject to a legitimacy 
requirement. In political theory, legitimacy is a property – whose nature is widely debated – 
that justifies the power of state or institutions over citizens (Peter 2017). In our case, 
legitimacy would be a constraint on the epistemic process, that is a constraint on the way in 
which thick concepts are approached by scientists and researchers. The purpose of such a 
constraint is to give this knowledge an additional layer of security: to the familiar scientific 
process covered in textbooks on measurement – more on that in Section II.2 – Strategy 
Three adds a new political requirement. 
 
Exactly what this requirement demands is a big question, which we begin to answer in Part 
II. For now a minimal definition is sufficient: Strategy Three requires that the process of 
specifying the content of a thick concept takes into account the relevant value judgments of 
those to whose lives stand to be affected by this research. This is the sense in which 
Strategy Three calls for democratisation. How exactly? Full electoral competition, 
representative parliaments, and other large scale democratic exercises are typically ill-
suited to the meticulous and niche process of measurement. So what options are there?  
 
Recent decades have seen a rise of public participation in science – a diverse movement 
that takes many forms from citizen science, to public consultations, to simple outreach.9 We 
take cue from one strand of this movement, namely stakeholder engagement. Stakeholders 
are individuals and communities who are outside the scientific process but who have a 
genuine interest at stake in a given scientific or healthcare project.10 In our case, the 
stakeholders have an interest in how social scientists operationalise thick concepts, because 
these thick concepts may be used to rearrange their lives through new policies and 
institutions. So Strategy Three invites scientists to share the power and the responsibility of 
this task with the full of range of potential users of these concepts and those who stand to 
lose or benefit from them.  
 
In the case of wellbeing, this strategy calls for researchers to learn whether their 
preconceptions about wellbeing line up with the views held by the people whose wellbeing 
they are trying to measure and to study, namely the stakeholders. Crucially, the demand is 
not just to learn about the wellbeing of the stakeholder, but to learn what the stakeholders 
think about how to gauge their wellbeing and to take this information into account. So it is a 
 
9 See Douglas 2005 for an early overview of the efforts and their rationale, and Schrogel & Kolleck 2019, Elliott 
2017 (chapter 7) for more recent surveys. 




meta-demand to reflect the values of your stakeholders in the methodology of your 
research. Strategy Three shares with Strategy One the idea that concepts sometimes have 
to be engineered for purposes of research, rather than inherited, and it shares with Strategy 
Two the desire to preserve their evaluative thickness. But they have to be engineered 
responsibly.11 
 
In today’s landscape we see two kinds of attempts to implement Strategy Three: by the 
letter and by the spirit. Scientists follow the letter of this option when they gesture towards 
democratic legitimacy of their measures without actually going through any process of 
legitimation. For example, we showed above how proponents of life satisfaction sometimes 
defend it as the most democratic definition of wellbeing because it enables people to 
“assess their lives on the basis of whatever they consider important to themselves”. 
Similarly, when Martha Nussbaum formulates the capabilities approach she too make an 
argument to the effect that using capabilities is the best way to respect citizens’ autonomy 
(Nussbaum 2000). These claims certainly count as attempts to give a political justification 
for a respective measure, rather than to make it into a technical term or to keep the value 
judgement in house. But arguably they do not live up to the spirit of Strategy Three. In case 
of life satisfaction, nobody asks stakeholders whether this concept is a fair representation of 
their views about wellbeing, whether 1–10 scales accurately measure those views, or even 
what determines their life satisfaction. And there is certainly no attempt here to make room 
for a challenge by the stakeholders of the experts. In case of capabilities, Nussbaum’s self-
generated list of ten has been criticised for sidestepping consultation and many capability 
theorists work towards implementing participatory methods for filling out the content of 
this approach (Robeyns 2006). 
 
So how could wellbeing measurement live up to the spirit, and not just the letter, of 
Strategy Three? Efforts will likely differ by context. Recent efforts by capabilities theorists to 
democratise the operationalisation of their paradigm have often involved coproducing 
capabilities surveys through extensive interviewing of and discussions with communities.12 
Such an approach may be unwieldy at large scale. At national levels there have instead been 
consultations soliciting citizen input into what official statistics should reflect if they are to 
represent wellbeing of these citizens.13In the field of healthcare, the scale of analysis can 
often be a single patient, and indeed, involving patients in the production of scales 
representing their quality of life is increasingly standard practice.14 Some settings may call 
for a mixed approach. For example, scholars of educational guidance and counselling have 
also recently trialled what they call a ‘stakeholder-responsive approach to researching 
wellbeing’ (Daniels et al 2018). These practices can differ a great deal in their scale and 
scope – they can be interviews, surveys, consultations, focus groups, or citizen fora – but 
they share an intention to democratise well-being in one way or another.  
 
 
11 Conceptual engineering is a familiar proposal in philosophy of wellbeing, but its advocates do not typically 
consider the need for stakeholder input, see Prinzing 2020, Tiberius and Hall 2010.  
12 See, for example, Yap and Yu (2016) and Greco et al. (2015). 
13 These have taken place in the UK, New Zealand, Germany, among others. See this FOI press release by the 
UK’s Office of National Statistics about the process they follow: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/aboutus/transparencyandgovernance/freedomofinformationfoi/uknationalwellbeingi
ndex  





I.4 Choosing between the three strategies 
 
We submit that these strategies likely exhaust the presently available options of dealing 
with thick concepts and that, strictly speaking, they are mutually exclusive. If you reject the 
technical term approach of Strategy One, then you have to make a decision about the 
source of evaluative content in your thick concepts. One source can be the intellectual 
decision taken by yourself (or perhaps your immediate research community) – Strategy Two 
– and another source can be a political process involving more than just the experts – 
Strategy Three. As a matter of fact, it might be difficult to classify each instance of actual 
research as falling into one and only one of the three spaces. We have found that the same 
project can mix the rhetoric of two or three of our strategies, because researchers will not 
always invest the resources needed for formulating their strategy carefully and with full 
consideration. It is not uncommon to claim both that life satisfaction is a technical term 
while also making a brief appeal to its democratic credentials. This stance is logically 
possible, but strictly speaking, one or the other reason has to be a primary justification for 
the use of a given concept.  
 
Now we are in a position to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses. Each of the three 
strategies has a long history. As a result, each is well integrated into existing practices that 
researchers presumably regard as well motivated and useful. So it would be unwise to take 
an uncompromising approach presenting one strategy as uniquely superior always and 
everywhere, while debunking all others. We submit that there may be good reasons to 
pursue any of the three strategies depending on circumstances. However, we shall present 
what we see as serious short-comings of Strategies One and Two for research close to policy 
and law. In those cases, treating thick concepts as technical terms as Strategy One 
recommends amounts to abrogating responsibility that scientists have to anticipate and 
forestall misuse of their work. Imposing researchers’ own value judgments as per Strategy 
Two raises dangers of coercion. These issues will not always trump all considerations, but 
they are substantial weaknesses nevertheless. Let us see why in more detail. 
 
Strategy One seeks to rid science of thick concepts altogether. This strategy stakes the 
authority of science in its ability to live up to the ideal of value-freedom, or rather a specific 
sub-ideal of it – neutrality (Lacey 2004). Neutrality demands that claims of science neither 
presuppose nor imply moral, political, or aesthetic judgments. Thick concepts fail the test of 
neutrality and are therefore illegitimate.15 This harsh stance is frequently justified by 
empirical claims that failures of neutrality are dangerous and will undermine public trust in 
science (Arneson 2019, Haack 2007). We are not convinced. Empirical studies show that 
public trust in science responds to many different factors (Rutjens et al 2018). Scientists' 
refusal to handle concepts that are meaningful and significant to the public could plausibly 
undermine this trust as well.  
 
The key consideration we are marshalling here comes from two sources: a general 
responsibility of scientists to the communities that support them and a specific 
 
15 Advocates of using subjective well-being measures in public policy seem animated by these concerns. Diener 
and Seligman (2004, p. 1-2), for example, argue that: “we believe that measures of well-being are—and must 




responsibility generated by thick concepts. The first kind arises out of what Heather Douglas 
calls “the moral terrain of science”, that is the network of duties scientists acquire due to 
their status as producers of powerful and valuable knowledge within the constraints of 
broader societal good (Douglas 2014). The second source is Max Weber’s demand that  
social scientists have a responsibility to investigate phenomena that are ‘significant’ to 
people, where significance reflects a subjective dimension of communal living (Weber 
1949). Because of this responsibility, social scientists do not have the freedom to convert 
concepts into technical terms (he thought this was a contrast with natural scientists who do 
have such a freedom, but we do not wish to follow Weber in this thought). This is not the 
only responsibility social scientists have and there may be other responsibilities that will 
conflict with this one. However, the general idea stands - other things being equal, it is good 
for science to study phenomena that are significant to communities that enable their work. 
 
If we accept this constraint, we can ask what it means for scientists to fulfil this 
responsibility. Does it mean they get to pick a significant phenomenon such as wellbeing 
and define it as an expert would? This brings us to what is wrong with Strategy Two. 
Defining a thick term takes conceptual and empirical work – what is wellbeing? How does it 
relate to being good or being healthy? How can we know when we are well? Answering 
these questions has been the province of philosophy, literary fiction, religion, personal 
reflection, psychotherapy, and more recently science. But there are no uncontroversial 
answers to these questions, and there is thus no definition of wellbeing that is obviously 
and uniquely superior to all else (Alexandrova 2017). So it takes some hubris for scientists to 
pursue Strategy Two. Scientists who keep value judgments in-house may be doing so for 
reasons of convenience and speed, but they should not be doing so because they take 
themselves to be the sole and the best experts about well-being. This expertise is in fact 
distributed.  
 
A proponent of Strategy Two might retort in two ways. First, responsible scientists do their 
homework and do not just consult their untutored intuitions when picking a definition of 
well-being. Secondly, they may argue that adopting a given conception of wellbeing does 
not reflect a conviction that it is the correct one, but just a belief that it is a significant 
conception for science to investigate. Neither of these replies justify Strategy Two. Scientists 
can be very thoughtful about the conceptions they adopt: Kahneman cites Bentham as his 
intellectual inspiration for ‘objective happiness’, the capabilities theorists cite Aristotle, and 
life satisfaction advocates too have their standard list of references (Tatarkiewics 1976 and 
Sumner 1996). But it is one thing to identify a lineage for your favourite theory and it is 
another to show that your choice has legitimacy in the public sphere. For the latter task, 
lineage, no matter how eminent, is not enough. There is still a danger that the chosen 
theory does not reflect the values of the people you study. Nor does the judgment of 
significance made in-house, to which the second reply appeals, has the legitimacy it could 
have if it was made inclusively.  
 
This is why Strategy Three emerges as most attractive when the research in question is close 
to action. Sometimes the benefits of Strategies One or Two outweigh their costs. For 
example, Strategy One is acceptable when the study is highly theoretical, exploring 
uncharted areas, and far from applications, while Strategy Two can conceivably be justified 




is so robust that it holds on any definition of wellbeing. But outside these contexts, Strategy 
Three has a prima facie advantage of being upfront about the evaluative content (unlike 
Strategy One) and being responsible about the limits of scientific judgment (unlike Strategy 
Two).16  
 
What does it to implement Strategy Three for measurement? 
 
 
Part II: Implementing legitimacy 
 
Our goal in this section is to articulate a plausible and a realistic ideal of participatory 
measurement, for this is a way to implement the spirit not just the letter of Strategy Three. 
We start on the basis of an account of measurement built specially for social and medical 
sciences and then build a participatory element into this account. 
 
 
II.1 A theory of measurement for thick concepts  
 
An influential account of measurement by Norman Bradburn, Nancy Cartwright, and 
Jonathan Fuller requires that the process of constructing and justifying measures, especially 
in sciences of policy and healthcare, fulfils three desiderata: 
 
1. We define the concept or quantity, identifying its boundaries, fixing which 
features belong to it and which do not (characterization). 
2. We define a metrical system that appropriately represents the quantity or concept 
(representation). 
3. We formulate rules for applying the metrical system to tokens to produce the 
measurement results (procedures). (Bradburn et al. 2016, p.3) 
 
This account is a good starting point for us because it pulls together ingredients of 
measurement that are normally treated separately. It also treats all three requirements as 
equal, in contrast to the earlier theories that focused on representation almost uniquely 
(Suppes 1998). This account is consistent with other influential views of measurement such 
as the model-based account, which conceives of measurement as a coupling between two 
ingredients: 1) a concrete process of interaction between an instrument and the 
environment and 2) an abstract model that represents this process (Tal 2020, Section 7). 
Bradburn et al.’s theory is helpful because it unpacks more deeply the stages of 
construction of such a process and the corresponding model and it does so in a way that is 
recognisable to social and medical scientists. It is thus unsurprising that this three-stage 
account is also consistent with the textbook recommendations for measure development, 
validation, and implementation (de Vet et al 2011).  
 
 
16 Our argument here is similar to Haybron and Tiberius 2015 who argue that in the context of public policy 
researchers should adopt a subjective conception of wellbeing, steering maximally close to citizen values. We 
are taking this line of thought further, recommending that citizens also should be able to vet the construct and 




Let us now see how the three-part framework applies to measurement of wellbeing. To 
fulfil characterisation, wellbeing needs to be defined first as a concept. The questions to ask 
at this stage include: is wellbeing predicated of an individual or a community? Does it 
encompass just welfare or also justice? Is the wellbeing in question all-things-considered or 
focused only on a specific context, like the wellbeing of newborns? Secondly, researchers 
need to decide what states or processes in the world realise this concept: are they people’s 
aggregated subjective states and if so which states exactly? Or are they the states that 
describe objective features of their lives and if so which features? Or are they some 
combination of subjective and objective indicators? Or perhaps they are not states at all 
but processes (McClimans and Browne 2012). This is the point at which heavy-duty 
theorising must take place and the various philosophical theories of wellbeing play an 
essential role. 
 
Moving to the second stage of representation, the wellbeing states or processes identified 
as relevant at the stage of characterisation must be connected to observable indicators 
whose values should fall along a scale. There are agreed upon conventions about the 
nature of these scales: they can be ordinal, interval, or ratio. In wellbeing it is rare to see 
fully interval scales, let alone ratio scales, and ordinal scales are most common. The 
indicators making up these scales can be subjective reports of, for example, happiness or 
life satisfaction, objective indicators of quality of life, or some combination of the above, 
provided there is a credible story about how variation in the value of these indicators 
enables their comparison. This is the stage at which the numerical structure of the 
indicators needs to be shown to correspond to the structure of wellbeing as specified at the 
stage of characterisation. This is normally accomplished by techniques such as 
representation theorems, or Rasch modelling, or more controversially construct validation 
(Vessonen 2020, Alexandrova 2017 chapter 5). This stage is usually considered the business 
of psychometrics or metrology more generally. 
 
At the final stage, measurement requires clear and comprehensive procedures. For 
example, if wellbeing is characterised by a certain class of mental states represented by 
self-reports, how are those self-reports to be collected and collated, by whom and under 
what circumstances?  
 
Now that we see the overall shape of measurement, we can ask what it would mean to 
make this process participatory. As we mentioned in our discussion of Strategy Three, we 
wish to explore the participatory option in spirit, not just the letter. Making sure that 
measures of wellbeing respond to people’s priorities takes more than just using subjective 
and maximally open indicators such as life satisfaction. Stakeholders also need to have a 
real say about the survey items and how their answers are used to ascribe to them a 
particular level of wellbeing. This input needs to fit in with the above three-stage theory of 
measurement. To flesh out how this is supposed to work we turn to the concept of co-
production because it is uniquely attuned to the necessity of attending to different kinds of 








II.2 Joining measurement and co-production 
 
Co-production is a term with fuzzy meaning used in several fields often to mean different 
things. In the hands of public policy, public administration, healthcare, and technology 
scholars it describes a model of governance, care, and service provision that involves users 
in all aspects of design, delivery, and evaluation (Osborne et al 2016). In science and 
technology studies, co-production captures the fact that scientific theories, instruments, 
and other products emerge from a complex interplay of nature, researchers, users, 
institutions, audiences (Jassanoff 2007). These uses converge on the ambition of bottom-up 
collaborative work, whether in science, policy, or design. Our focus on measurement of 
thick concepts necessitates a bespoke definition of co-production, hereafter co-
production*, based on these existing ones. We are neither producing a service or a policy, 
nor making an empirical claim about the nature of the scientific process. Rather we are 
looking for a normative account of responsible measurement when phenomena are 
denoted by thick concepts. Hence we propose the following definition: 
 
Co-production* is an arrangement for sharing power and responsibility in the 
process of defining thick concepts and developing their measures. This arrangement 
requires, first, recognising different types of expertise that each group of 
stakeholders have about these concepts and their measurement and, second, 
ensuring that the final products meet, to the extent that it is possible, the demands 
stemming from each type of expertise. 
 
Let us unpack each element of this definition for our example of wellbeing. When a project 
adopts a definition of wellbeing, the power resides in the possibility of using this definition 
to alter people’s lives through policy, healthcare, and services. For example, recent work in 
happiness economics in the UK identifies mental illness as the strongest determinant of life 
satisfaction and urges provision of cognitive behavioural therapy as the most cost effective 
policy (Clark et al 2018). Such a policy recommendation naturally comes with all the 
attendant consequences – redirection of welfare spending, redesign of services, and 
possibly even coercion, such as when CBT becomes a condition of unemployment benefits 
(Friedli & Stern 2015). In this case, scholarly responsibility requires thinking through the 
consequences of one’s research once its results enter into the public sphere and policy 
discourse. When researchers produce knowledge about wellbeing, it is on them to watch 
out for unintended harmful consequences of this knowledge, at least to the extent that it is 
foreseeable. These are well known and uncontroversial constraints on science, whether it 
concerns physics of weapons, biology of viruses, or determinants of wellbeing (Douglas 
2003, 2014). A measurement process ‘shares’ this power and responsibility when it is 
organised in a way that distributes them among all stakeholders. All stakeholders should 
have a say in the conceptualisation and measurement of wellbeing to the extent that their 
distinctive expertise allows. And if they have a say, they acquire a responsibility for 
consequences of this definition. 
 
The next crucial clarification is who counts as a stakeholder in projects that involve thick 
concepts. We follow a definition of a stakeholder for contexts of research rather than for 
corporate or management contexts. Such definitions generally identify stakeholders with 




reasonably foreseeable extent.17 Although these discussions often draw a distinction 
between scientists and stakeholders, for purposes of measurement of wellbeing such a 
distinction is unsuitable. Scientists are stakeholders – it matters to them that wellbeing be 
measured as well as it could be – and so are people and organisations outside academia. So 
we propose three very general classes of stakeholders for our particular focus: 
 
a) Members of the public, especially service users 
b) Policy makers and service providers 
c) Scholarly researchers 
 
This is a natural division within contemporary evidence-based policy. Academic researchers 
are supposed to produce knowledge that gets translated into practice by policy makers and 
service providers, with the goal of improving outcomes for members of the public (Marmot 
2004). Of course, sometimes the researcher is also the policy maker and a member of the 
public. So this distinction is between roles different groups occupy, not between stable 
categories in which they belong.  
 
Co-production must recognise that, when it comes to thick concepts, people playing these 
three roles bring distinctive expertise, as we summarise in Table 1. Members of the public 
are typically the ones whose wellbeing is being studied and their perspective on their own 
wellbeing is clearly of unique significance. In this role people have what is sometimes called 
‘lived expertise’, in the sense that their knowledge of wellbeing comes from navigating daily 
tasks of life often from the vantage point of their own circumstances such as disability, 
poverty, or another source of perspective (Park 2020). This is in contrast to the role of 
scholarly researchers for whom wellbeing and measurement are objects of technical study 
undertaken at universities or think tanks. Their expertise covers existing definitions of 
wellbeing from scholarly literatures, the standard measures used in different disciplines, 
and how these measures are tested and validated. Finally, policy makers and service 
providers represent a distinctive professional expertise about how the world of politics and 
science gets translated into actual institutions, therapies, and initiatives on the ground. This 
expertise includes an understanding of implementation and the nitty gritty of applying thick 
concepts in real world policy.  
 
Stakeholder role Distinctive expertise 
Members of public  Lived expertise 
Scholarly researchers Technical expertise about theories underlying 
measurement 
 
17 See this HEFCE guide to stakeholder analysis in the UK https://www.vitae.ac.uk/doing-research/leadership-
development-for-principal-investigators-pis/leading-a-research-project/applying-for-research-
funding/research-project-stakeholders. In the environmental and climate research the definitions of 
stakeholders are developed specifically for conservation and waste management projects and involve any 





Policy makers and service-
providers 
Professional expertise about delivery and 
implementation  
Table 1: Stakeholders and expertise about thick concepts 
 
Each of these types of expertise is relevant to measurement and a good measure of a thick 
concept is one that emerges when the three sets of experts learn from each other in an 
equal and productive arrangement, where no expertise dominates another. 
 
Let us now extend this model to measurement. The key is to show how our three kinds of 
expertise contribute to the three demands on measurement, that is characterisation, 
representation, and procedures. Table 2 captures the challenge: 
 
Stakeholder role Distinctive expertise Contribution to 
measurement 
Members of public  Lived expertise Characterisation 
Representation 
Procedures 






Policy makers and 
service-providers 
Professional expertise about 




Table 2: Stakeholders, expertise, and measurement 
 
We add the rightmost column to show that experts in each of the three roles contribute to 
each of the three elements of measurement. However, experts in different roles are likely 
to have different levels of investment into these elements and their contribution will be 
distinctive at each level. We bolded those elements of measurement that different experts 
are likely to attend to more than others in virtue of their knowledge, but without implying 
that they cannot also make distinctive contributions at all three stages.  
 
Lived experience gives members of the public a unique purchase on characterisation of 
whatever thick concept is in question. This experience is essential for articulating the 
content and the boundaries of the concept as characterisation requires. However, this lived 
expertise does not typically extend to representation. Representation demands 
quantification that is not normally present in daily life. Procedures, on the other hand, are 
likely to be more visible to those members of the public that are on the receiving end of 
measurement. They are the ones who will be filling out the surveys and pondering how to 
reflect their views within the constraints of questionnaire items. 
 
Scholarly researchers are likely to have a lot to say about characterisation and 
representation. In the wellbeing sciences, they will be familiar with different theoretical 




starting points of all the existing constructs. Academics are also supposed to have a grip on 
representation, the most technical and esoteric aspect of measurement. Although they 
might have views on the third element, that is measurement procedures, unless they 
regularly administer surveys themselves, they do not have a first-hand experience of this. 
Academics do not typically spend a lot of their time and attention on what happens to their 
questionnaires once they get deployed in the world outside of research. 
 
Finally, we hypothesise that professional expertise gives a special purchase on the 
procedures and less so on characterisation and representation. Service providers and policy 
makers are on the implementation end of things and they invest energies into delivery 
platforms of surveys and their operation. They are especially attuned to clarity of survey 
items, their lengthiness, and the ways they might alienate people. They would be aware, 
for example, of whether qualitative or quantitative measures would be more useful to 
service providers.  
 
The idea behind co-production* it is to bring out different types of expertise as they map 
onto the different elements of measurement. Since no group of experts is in the driver’s 
seat, all can contribute everywhere. But the point of recognising different types of 
expertise is to allow that some of us know more about some aspects of measurement than 
others. Even when we lack expertise about characterisation, representation, or procedures, 
it is good to have oversight from people playing different roles. The hope is that when the 
process of co-production is organised and managed well, the impact of each expertise is 
maximised. There is a learning process in all directions. The emerging measure 
consequently has the best chance of meeting all three demands: the phenomenon is well 
characterised, faithfully represented, and there are effective procedures for gauging it. 
Such a learning process may well show that there are trade-offs between characterisation, 
representation, and procedures. True wellbeing may not be quantifiable, or a true quantity 
may not be measurable through realistically available procedures. Coproduction* may turn 
up a measure that is deeply compromised but nonetheless fit for its context-specific 
purpose, or no measure at all.18 Our point is that, if such participatory measurement is at all 
theoretically justifiable, it should have the shape we have described here. As it happens we 
do believe this ideal is realistic and we now move on to illustrate this. 
 
 
II.3 Case study of ongoing project with Turn2us 
 
The theory above is informed by our experiences collaborating with Turn2us, a national 
anti-poverty charity in the UK. Turn2us has a wide range of activities that all fall under the 
banner of helping people who come upon hard times financially. Their work includes issuing 
emergency grants that enable people to cover bills, helping people with the often confusing 
and stressful process of applying for welfare benefits (this is accomplished through an 
online-platform called the Benefits Calculator), and campaigning for policy reforms that 
would reduce poverty. Turn2us has a wealth of experience with coproduction of their 
services and they invited us to participate in the development of a concept and measure of 
‘thriving’. They were interested in what thriving means in the context of financial hardship 
 
18 Philosophers of measurement have explored such conflicts and trade-offs in Larroulet-Philippi 2020 and 




and how they could monitor the impact of their activities on the thriving of their clients. A 
close relative of ‘wellbeing’ and ‘flourishing’, thriving is a thick concept with a temporal 
dimension – it is an effort to learn to live well over time. How can such a concept be 
coproduced? 
 
In conversation with Turn2us we developed a blueprint of the process with the following 
key stages: 
 
Survey 1  Working group  Workshop  Survey 2 
 
Survey 1 was distributed using Turn2us’ fortnightly newsletter and received 1550 responses 
from users of Turn2us’ services. It asked them about their conception of thriving. Alongside 
an open ended question about what thriving means to you, this survey elicited respondents’ 
attitudes to classic theories of wellbeing. It also posed some conventional questions about 
what aspects of wellbeing respondents’ valued relatively more (such as feelings of purpose 
or good mood). But we were especially keen to hear what they feel others misunderstand 
about thriving of people in their circumstances. We brought the results of this survey to the 
working group to give it an initial steer and inform its deliberations. 
 
The working group was selected to represent equally the three groups of stakeholders of 
this exercise: 1) people whose thriving is or was undermined by sudden financial insecurity, 
2) the Turn2us employees, and 3) scholars who study thriving and poverty. These three 
groups represent three corresponding types of expertise: lived expertise, professional 
expertise, and technical expertise. The remit of the working group was to develop a 
measure of thriving in an intense and equitable deliberative process. The group thus had to 
be small enough to build a trusting rapport and to enable in-depth discussion and one-to-
one interviews, but big enough so that each expertise is sufficiently represented. In a series 
of meetings chaired by the Turn2us coproduction lead Abby Meadows, the working group 
accomplished the following tasks: 
• examined the results of the initial survey to get clear on the priorities of the 
users of Turn2us. 
• set out the terms of the interviews wherein each participants interviewed at 
least one member of each expert group to which they do not belong, focusing on 
what thriving means to them. We borrowed ideas from the practice of 
“relational interviewing” for this process, which emphasises genuine power-
sharing and two-way learning between participants and eliminates the 
distinction between interviewee and interviewer (Fujii 2017, Hydén 2014).  
• After 23 interviews were conducted, the academics on the team performed 
qualitative analysis of the themes and presented these themes to the working 
group as a whole.  
• The group then worked towards systematising these themes and ensuring they 
conformed with the lived experience of the service users and the practical needs 
of Turn2us practitioners. This involved the academic group presenting their 






Once we had a consensus within the working group on a preliminary theory of thriving, we 
took it first to Turn2us’ board of directors for input and then to a larger workshop. Here the 
working group was joined by an additional 12 lived experts who scrutinised it and offered 
suggestions for improvement. In the event, most of these concerned the language of the 
theory and its presentation, rather than elements of the theory itself. These suggestions 
were incorporated into a final report that was then approved by workshop participants. 
That report was then again presented to an online survey through Turn2us’ newsletter for 
endorsement. This methodology was designed to balance, at least to some extent, the high 
logistical demands of engaging in depth with expert groups to formulate a rich and context-
sensitive theory of thriving, and the need for the theory to be representative. The working 
group and workshop processes provided the depth, while the surveys at either end 
enhanced representativeness.  
 
Such was the process. The substantive theory and measure of thriving developed in this 
process is available on the Turn2us webpage.19 Here we report only enough to illustrate the 
practical implementation of the model of coproduction* proposed in Section II.2. As the 
model recommends, we identified different types of expertise corresponding to the 
different roles of stakeholders. Turn2us had a wealth of experience with coproduction and 
they recruited lived and professional experts who had the experience and the availability to 
engage in the lengthy and detailed discussions. Our model of coproduction* also specifies 
that each type of expert knowledge be accorded respect and equality vis-à-vis others. To 
ensure healthy power dynamics in the working group, the chair compiled a coproduction 
social contract that enforced norms of respect and forestalled dominating behaviour by any 
members of the group. Substantive grant funds were dedicated to providing payments (the 
hourly equivalent to London living wage) to the coproduction partners for the time they 
gave the exercise. The published outputs on thriving are planned so that each coproduction 
partner gets credit as a co-author on reports and articles. Together these actions help to 
create a sense of trust and partnership and enable genuine learning in all directions: lived 
experts to professional experts, professional experts to academics, and so on. 
 
The other key aspect of our model of coproduction* is the distinction between 
characterisation, representation, and procedures we inherit from Bradburn, Cartwright and 
Fuller. How is this distinction reflected in our work with Turn2us? It is fair to say that the 
exercise as conducted so far has focused mostly on characterisation of thriving, some on 
procedures, and less on representation. While Turn2us is interested in measuring thriving to 
track their effectiveness, we quickly realised that there should not be one such measure for 
all aspects of their work. Instead, different activities of this charity call for different levels of 
quantification and varieties of appraisal. The specific application of each measure bears 
heavily on how it should be formulated. Indeed, Turn2us has found that off-the-shelf 
measures developed by academics are unsuitable to its operations. In particular, capabilities 
surveys are too onerous to impose on someone desperately seeking financial help, and the 
charity has found that subjective wellbeing questions are insufficiently sensitive to changes 
in respondent circumstances as a result of Turn2us interventions. So it seems bespoke 
 
19 The detailed description of the coproduced theory and our methodology can be found in Fabian et al 2021, 





measures are required, but Turn2us wants these to emerge organically as it goes about 
applying the theory of thriving in its operations.  
 
So at the time of writing this article the working group had developed a construct of thriving 
under financial insecurity with some indications about how it can be gauged, but without 
yet a fully validated scale of it. We have devised potential questionnaire items and 
formulated ways in which these items can be integrated into the activities of Turn2us, but 
this does not yet meet the standard of representation and procedures as formulated in the 
Bradburn et al theory. Still, even recognising these limits, our experience with Turn2us 
serves as evidence that coproduction of thick concepts such as thriving is possible.  
 
 
Part III: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In Part I we argued that it is desirable to co-produce measures of phenomena denoted by 
thick concepts. In Part II we showed, using the example of thriving under financial hardship, 
that with due support and preparation, it is feasible to implement a process of coproduction 
that meets the spirit as well as the letter of the theory in Part I. In conclusion we comment 
on the limits of our proposal and put it in a wider context of participatory methods and 
wellbeing sciences. 
 
Our primary focus has been the production of a measure for a specific context.20 Its value is 
in focusing on the distinctive needs of Turn2us, which enabled a deep deliberative 
engagement across all stakeholders. The conception of thriving we were able to articulate is 
more detailed and in line with what Alexandrova (2017) calls mid-level theories of 
wellbeing: theories geared to a specific group of people in a specific context, rather than the 
general homo sapiens. This grounded nature might even be what makes this concept thick 
rather than thin (Abend 2019). However, we concede that such contextuality will not always 
be possible or indeed desirable. Sometimes stakeholders are a far bigger and more diverse 
population and the purposes of the measures are less specific. This is the case for national 
or international efforts to develop wellbeing statistics. In those cases indicators are 
validated through country-wide consultations and expert input. Without necessarily 
endorsing these initiatives, we nevertheless acknowledge that coproduction* may not be 
right for these purposes. At the same time our approach taking a general thick concept and 
converting it to a locally legitimate measure should be implementable far beyond thriving or 
wellbeing. 
 
Another potential weakness of our proposal applies to all participatory approaches. They 
can all too easily turn into box ticking exercises that reify their public without recognising 
their variability and fluidity (Chilvers and Kearns 2020). Worse even idealistic pursuits like 
citizen science can be highjacked by special interests and play the role of public relations, 
providing its initiators a show of legitimacy where in fact there is none (Blacker et al 2021). 
There are no simple fixes to these problems. Co-production* will only safeguard legitimacy 
of thick concepts if the process is implemented with care and due respect for the expertise 
 





of all involved. Our theoretical model and our case study with Turn2us is a bona fide 
attempt to do so. 
 
Philosophers of science will see other limits in our model. Coproduction* presumes that it 
will be possible to safeguard the high scholarly standards of measurement while opening it 
up for lay participation. Measurement and validation are some of the most technical areas 
of science. Judging whether or not a given measure performs at all ends of the scale and 
meets the long list of validities that metrology demands takes intricate expertise. How 
realistic is it to expect all stakeholders to engage with these questions? Aren’t we opening 
the door to the possibility of coproduced measures of poor technical validity?  
 
Here too we gladly acknowledge that our model, in allowing stakeholder input at all levels 
of measurement, does potentially invite compromises. But we think such compromises are 
worth considering if we are to avoid giving one group of experts – namely metrologists and 
psychometricians – undue authority. In the health sciences it is common for patient groups 
to contribute to the initial stage of scale design. However, psychometric validation, by virtue 
of coming last in the process of measure construction, often overrides the judgments of 
patients with lived experience. The patients may believe that a certain ability is crucial to 
their quality of life with their medical condition, but if the item representing this ability does 
not have the right statistical properties, it can be dumped.21 This practice may sometimes be 
appropriate but it is hard to defend universally. Historians and philosophers of 
measurement have shown time and again the many unformalizable and controversial 
judgment calls that enter this process (Chang 2004, McClimans 2017, Stegenga 2015b). Our 
view is that, when it comes to thick concepts and life-changing policies, it is a good idea to 
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